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This article examines whether the European Commission succeeded in reducing the negative 
socio-environmental externalities of road transport in Northern, Central and South-eastern 
Europe by introducing the First Infrastructure Package and Interoperability Directive that 
opened rail freight markets to competition. Using results from the EC-sponsored REORIENT 
project, the article searches for causal links between the completeness of legislative adherence 
and the occurrence of market rivalry. In so doing, it draws on the New Public Management 
(NPM) theorem which provided conceptual underpinnings for liberalisation policy and the 
notion of path-dependency warning that effectiveness of any public policy is contingent on the 
features of its implementation context.  The article contrasts the adoption of rail deregulation 
directives by the old and rich EU-states in the Nordic region with the newly liberated, more 
recent EU-members in Central and South-eastern Europe in order to expose how the political, 
economic and cultural features of these countries affected the quality of legislative compliance 
and market rivalry. This method unearthed a clearly polarised picture of inter-country 
compliance and competition pattern. Norway, Sweden and Finland exhibit high levels of legal 
adherence without however, much intra-rail competition. Cut-off from the government subsidies, 
these countries’ state railways compete today with road operators, without however facing much 
rivalry from truckers. On the other hand, the new EU-members still lag on legislative 
conformance, but their licensing authorities granted operating permits to quite many private 
entrants. These carriers compete fiercely with the national incumbents, but the rail service quality 
they provide does not as yet threaten the dominance of truck in national freight transport. As a 
result, no inter-modal competition exists there. These findings indicate that liberalisation of rail 
freight market has not as yet reduced the road-rail imbalance in European freight markets  nor 
curbed the negative socio-environmental externalities associated with motorised transport. 
Methodologically, this article exposed the analytical shortcoming of the NPM theorem and the 
strong empirical relevance of the path-dependency hypothesis. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last 30 years, the rail freight transport in European Community has been in steep 
decline as compared to road. Since this development gave rise to severely negative socio-
environmental harms such as congestion, accidents, and considerable ground and atmospheric 
pollution, it has impelled the European Parliament and the European Commission to open in 
2001 rail freight market to competition.  The most immediate targets for this new rail transport 
policy were the national railway monopolies which operational and market inefficiencies were 
responsible for road-rail competitive distortion, the hegemony of truck in the European freight 
transfer and the consequent accumulation of socio-environmental ills (Stehmann and Zellhofer, 
2004). Therefore in 2001, the EC has issued the First Infrastructure Package composed of three 
directives, which provided a legislative groundwork for liberalisation of European freight 
railways3. 
By employing the concept of New Public Management (NPM), this paper explores how the 
liberalisation of European railways induced by the First Infrastructure Package and 
Interoperability Directive affected market dynamics in the Nordic, Central and South-eastern 
Europe.    
The New Public Management model served as a theoretical foundation for organizational 
reforms which, from the beginning of the 1980s, restructured public sectors in many developed 
countries. NPM provided a theoretical underpinning for the European Commission’s rail 
legislation which, in 2001, liberalised the European rail freight market4. Originating from public 
choice and managerial schools of thought, NPM evolved in response to the state’s inability to 
efficiently supply public services. It offered a way of achieving higher cost-effectiveness of the 
public sector, without compromising the government’s social commitments and duties (Boston, 
Martin and Welsh, 1996).  
2. Conceptual foundation 
Practical implementation of the NPM strategy consists of making use of market forces for 
modernisation of government functions either by transferring the traditional state’s 
responsibilities to the private sector, and/or by partly or wholly exposing public undertakings to 
competition and business instruments for managing their service provision. Employment of 
NPM entailed clear division of roles between politicians and administrators; politicians were 
supposed to formulate strategies, which administrators should implement.  This functional 
duality led to splitting of several large organizations, which traditionally performed many public 
functions into separate operative units devoted to attainment of one specific goal, and 
incentivisation of cost-effective goal achievements.  
However, bearing in mind the international scope of this study, our conceptual framework 
incorporated also the notion of path-dependency (Krasner, 1988), which recognizes that  different 
                                                        
3 The First Infrastructure Package included three directives:1) 2001/12/EC on access rights for international 
freight services between rail undertakings and infrastructure managers, separation of accounts for passenger and 
freight operations, separation of transport operations from capacity allocation, infrastructure charging, and 
licensing, 2)2001/13/EC on licensing of rail undertakings, and 3)2001/14/EC on allocation of railway 
infrastructure capacity, levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification. The 
Interoperability Directive 2001/16/EC, deals with technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) between the 
national systems of rail infrastructure, operations and information transfer. 
4 This new policy measures were grounded in the Articles 12, Articles 81 to 89, and Article 90 of the EEC 
Maastrich Treaty whose formulation that … ”undertakings entrusted with operations of service of general 
economic interest or having the character of a revenue producing shall be subject to rules contained in this Treaty, 
in particular to the rules of competition..” provided legal baseline for rail liberalisation directives. Official Journal, 
C340, 10/12/1997 p.020 –Consolidated version.  
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countries have different historical and cultural traditions, and therefore their reform processes 
may follow different trajectories (Christensen and Lægreid, 2004; Olsen, 2007). This approach 
suggests that the compliance process and the outcomes of the same European rail liberalization 
directives may be influenced by the target countries’ national conditions (Jansen, Osland and 
Hanf, 1998; Walker, Baarse, Van Velzen, and Järli, 2007). 
The liberalization of the European rail freight market can be seen as a paradigmatic manifestation 
of NPM because by opening rail markets to competition the EU legislator 1) terminated the legal 
and the functional status of the national railway monopolies, and 3) introduced new regulatory 
structures which separated the infrastructure and the signaling system managers, and the safety 
and security officials from passenger and cargo train operators. Besides being considered 
necessary for improvement of the rail sector’s operational efficiency and cost-effectiveness, this 
institutional devolution was also politically instrumental for dealing with an exponential rise in 
severely negative socio-environmental externalities associated with the continuosly growing 
motorized freight carriage. The EU legislator assumed that the opening of rail freight markets to 
intra-modal competition will improve rail service competitiveness, stimulate freight shift from 
road to rail, and gradually reduce the hegemony of truck in the European freight transfer. 
As a political strategy, NPM has been highly contested by social scientists.  The critics maintained 
that application of NPM leads to functional fragmentation and generates needs for more 
coordination  between the newly separated units within the rail freight sector, also in the Nordic 
countries (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Sørensen, 2005). 
Below we explore how the establishment of deregulated rail governance structures affected 
market opening in the old EU-members in the Nordic region as compared to the more recent EU-
entrants from the Central and South-eastern Europe, and whether the adoption of the new rail 
legislation in these two country categories contributed to attainment by the European Comission 
its socio-environmental objectives.  Therefore, our analysis of national variation in legislative 
conformance is related to the types of competition that emerged in response to the legislative 
reform. Our examination of factors underlying variability in rail market performance includes: 1) 
the differences in political, economic and cultural features of the countries studied, and 2) the 
national governments’ involvement in the process of legislative enforcement. Finally, we assess 
the conceptual utility of the NPM theorem and the “path-dependency” hypothesis for 
explanation of the developments reported. 
3. Research questions and data sources 
The article explores how the adoption of NPM, exemplified by the liberalised market governance, 
did affect market dynamics in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Poland, Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Greece, and Romania. One reason for probing into this issue derives from the need to 
assess whether implementation of new rail freight policy fulfilled the European Commission’s 
expectations for intra-modal competition, inter-modal rivalry, and shift of freight transfer from 
road to rail. Another arises from a quest for understanding how the governments’ involvement 
affected transition from a monopolistic market condition to a contestable rail business 
environment, and what kind of impacts these interventions have evoked.  
In examining the last issue, this study seeks not only to assess what kind of  forces may have 
underlay the inter-country variation in rail deregulation, but also whether a causal relationship 
between the introduction of a new regulatory structure and the development of competition in 
rail freight markets could be inferred.  
The paper builds on findings produced by “REORIENT”, a large EC-sponsored pan-European 
research programme which 1) explored variation in inter-country implementation of the First 
Infrastructure Package and Interoperability Directive, and 2) identified the different types of 
barriers that still permeate the national railway systems, and hinder the focal countries from 
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reaping the full benefits of rail deregulation. Factors driving these developments were examined 
using primary and secondary data. The main source of structured information was a ten-country 
survey of public officials and rail operators (both the state-owned and the private ones), which 
assessed progress in railway deregulation, the national features of legislation adoption, the 
occurrence of different types of barriers, and their impacts on rail markets5. In addition, results 
from a survey of shippers in twelve European countries have been used here All together the 
outcomes from the following five international studies provided input to this paper: 
1) “Interoperability Status and Progress in Implementation of the First Infrastructure 
Package in Ten European Countries” http://www.reorient.no  
2) “Is Rail Freight Still Popular in Central Europe? Views of Voting Public and   Local 
Politicians in Ten European Countries” http://www.reorient.no   
3) “Rail Market Opportunities in Central and South-eastern Europe” 
http://www.reorient.no  
4) “Barriers and Countermeasures Securing Seamless Freight Flows in    
  Pan-European Corridors” http://www.reorient.no   
5) “Economic, Social and Environmental Benefits of Rail Liberalization”  
http://www.reorient.no  
4. Implementation completeness and market dynamics 
Our examination of barriers that still hinder an effective market opening has established that 
Finland, Norway and Sweden score high on institutional completion of the First Infrastructure 
Package and Interoperability Directive.  
Yet, notwithstanding the fact that these nations score high on formal legislative compliance, 
neither Green Cargo nor CargoNet, the Swedish and the Norwegian cargo railways do not 
encounter much intra-rail competition from new market entrants. At the same time freight 
markets in Norway and Sweden keep growing considerably, spurred by growth in international 
trade, and specifically, in imports from the new EU member states. Within this environment, 
Cargo Net’s business volumes in Norway and Sweden do also grow, mainly due to provision of 
inter-modal service which successfully competes with road. Yet, this growth is much lower than 
the yearly growth in the tonnage of inbound and outbound freight volumes. Consequently, the 
market share of all-road freight carriage has continued to increase. Although Cargo Net 
complains that its future market growth is constrained by infrastructure shortage                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
caused by a combined rise in passenger and goods traffic, it still advertises availability of load 
carrying capacity on some trunk service lines. Thus, at the first glance Norway scores well on 
fulfilment of railway liberalisation directives because the country met all institutional 
requirements and the Norwegian operator entered into competition with truck. This happened 
however, without engagement in intra-rail contest, and without noticeable improvement in rail 
transport position in the Norwegian freight market.  
Similarly, Green Cargo AB, the Swedish state-owned rail freight carrier still dominates the full 
carload market (FCL) despite contemporary market operations of private entrants. However, 
these new rail companies have either taken over market niches which Green Cargo has 
abandoned due to the lack of economic profitability, or operate feeder traffic, or supply the 
national incumbent with complementary services such as traction, marshalling and management 
of inter-modal terminals. All these operations do not directly challenge Green Cargo’s dominance 
on the Swedish trunk network. One private rail undertaking runs scheduled trains between 
                                                        
5 A survey of public officials involved civil servants at national transportation ministries, competition authorities, 
and railway regulators in Sweden, Norway, Finland, Poland, the Czech Republicthe Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, and Greece. 
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Norway and Sweden dedicated to transfer of pulp and paper. In order to supply this service, the 
company acquired heavy-duty locomotives. Green Cargo was not interested in this market 
segment due to high sunk-cost of customer-specific investments. The overall position of rail 
transport in the fast growing Swedish freight market did not change over the last five years, 
indicating that that it was the truck operators who mainly benefited from  increases in volumes of 
goods shipped. 
This illustrates that intra-rail competition in Sweden is fairly marginal. The main result of this 
development is more cost-effective supply of rail freight service in the Swedish national market, 
without however, direct contest with private rail undertakings for the same routes, time slots, 
and customer categories.  
Finland represents a very special case where the institutional infrastructure for liberalized market 
governance is fully installed, but not a single new entrant has as yet been licensed for operations 
on the national network. Consequently, VR Cargo ÖY, the state-owned freight operator still 
enjoys unchallenged monopoly. However, VR Cargo ÖY competes vigorously with truck in the 
fast growing inter-modal container market. 
Market situations in Poland, the Czech Republic, Austria, Greece, and Romania differ noticeably. 
Despite the fact that Poland’s new regulatory apparatus scores relatively low on implementation 
of the First Infrastructure Package and Interoperability Directive, and that non-discriminatory 
market access is still a problem for private rail ventures, while investments in technical 
interoperability are still lacking, the market share of new entrants in domestic rail market reached 
20 p.c. in 2007.  This figure is by far one of the highest in the EU. The same market share has been 
achieved by the Czech private operators who run freight trains on a much smaller network. 
It is worthy to note that this competitive restructuring of Poland’s rail market has occurred 
amidst protracted fall in rail freight volumes. The fall began with Poland’s post-1980s shift to a 
market economy when the state-owned PKP was the nation’s sole rail freight carrier. However, 
the traffic decline on what is now the PKP Cargo’s network (still-state owned) intensified after 
2002, when the Polish government enacted rail deregulation legislation. PKP Cargo has suffered 
dramatic loss of market share and revenues in the face of rapid growth in freight volumes moved 
by new private rail companies. 
The main competition arena between PKP Cargo and the new entrants consists of carriage of 
coal, other minerals and chemicals, which until 2001 were monopolised by the state-owned 
carrier. In addition, a few private rail ventures have also challenged PKP Cargo in international 
traffic by creating border crossing alliances with foreign operators and/or wholly owned foreign 
subsidiaries allowing them to run freight trains between Poland and Germany, Poland and 
Belarus, Poland and The Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, and between Poland, Romania, 
and Ukraine6.  
Still, no competitive rail inter-modal service as yet is offered in Poland that could challenge the 
explosive growth in road traffic. So, despite the head-on domestic and international intra-rail 
rivalry, virtually no freight has been shifted from road to rail. Hence, truck is the only winner in 
the rapidly growing freight market stimulated by high expansion rate of the Polish economy. 
Because of the lack of inter-modal competition, Poland scores poorly on fulfilment of the goals of 
                                                        
6 In July 2007 PKP Cargo (the national rail freight operator in Poland) blocked the crossing of the Polish-Slovak 
border by a freight train ran by a Polish private railway company maintaining that this carrier had no right to 
perform international traffic. Since PKP Cargo’s behaviour breached the right to carry international trains granted 
by the First Infrastructure Package to international traffic operator, the carrier in question complained to the 
Polish and European competition authorities. Utilising  the market opening legislation, this operator runs five 
foreign subsidiaries and operates via six border-crossing alliances in order to serve international clients in 
Germany, Poland, France, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary in addition to partnerships with Belarusian, Russian 
and Ukrainian national rail incumbents. 
 
EJTIR 9(1), March 2009, pp. 31-45 
Ludvigsen and Osland 
Liberalisation of rail freight markets in the old and new EU-member states 
 
 
36 
the First Infrastructure Package. The competitive situation in the Czech rail freight market 
resembles that in Poland. 
Market conditions in Romania are even more puzzling. Despite severe shortcomings that still 
permeate Romania’s administrative rail apparatus the country’s regulatory authorities have 
licensed many private operators who in 2005 controlled 25 p.c. of the domestic rail freight 
market. Since then, the freight volumes served by private railways have grown considerably in 
competition with the national incumbent, CFR MARFA.  
Against this backdrop, rail administration authorities in Austria, Hungary and Greece have not 
so far completed the institutional separation between the infrastructure managers and the 
national cargo operators as required by the First Infrastructure Package. As a consequence, the 
national cargo companies in these countries still function as effective monopolies. 
This empirical evidence indicates that the effects of directive implementation diverge from the 
expectations of the European Commission because no clear relationship between the 
completeness of legal compliance and the structure of rivalry in rail freight markets could be 
observed.  
Rail operators in Norway and Sweden managed to develop strong inter-modal competition 
under the condition of strong regulatory fulfilment without however, venturing into intra-sector 
rivalry. On the other hand, operators in the new member states started fierce intra-rail rivalry 
despite incomplete market deregulation without, however, engaging into a rail-road contest. The 
latter did not result in any freight shift from road to rail. Still, in Greece, Hungary and Austria, 
the national rail administration authorities have not as yet fulfilled the basic legislative 
requirements imposed by the First Infrastructure Package. Intra-rail and inter-modal competition 
thus remains absent in those countries.  
The tables below compare the countries analyzed as regards completeness of market 
deregulation and occurrence of intra-modal and inter-modal competition. Space scarcity does not 
allow us to review the entire report on inter-country compliance, which was assessed by the 
REORIENT survey specified as item one in our data sources. However, the juxtaposition below 
utilises knowledge of differences in legislative adherence, and illustrates how the different 
national liberalisation standards contributed to two types of competition.  
   
Table 1.  Completeness of market deregulation and occurrence of intra-modal competition in 
the countries analysed 
 
  Deregulated Market Governance 
  Complete Incomplete 
Yes ? 
Poland,  
Romania,  
The Czech 
Republic, Intra-rail 
competition 
No 
Norway, 
Finland, 
Sweden 
Greece,  
Hungary, Austria 
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Table 2.  Occurrence of intra-modal and inter-modal competition in the countries analysed. 
 
  Road-rail competition 
  Yes No 
Yes ? 
Poland,  
the Czech Republic, 
Romania  Intra-rail 
competition 
No 
Norway, 
Finland, 
Sweden 
Austria, Hungary, 
Greece 
 
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic developed intra-rail 
competition despite not-yet-completed deregulation of rail freight markets. Norway, Sweden and 
Finland on the other hand, did not embark on intra-rail contest, despite the national fulfilment of 
all legal requirements. It also implies that neither Austria nor Hungary or Greece managed to 
complete their rail deregulation reform, and are devoid of intra-modal and inter-modal 
competition. 
Fierce intra-modal rivalry in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania led to a 15-30 percent 
price drop for rail carriage over 2005–2007, making rail transport more competitive. Thus, despite 
the prevalence of administrative, institutional, and political barriers to competition, some other 
forces must have unlocked market dynamics, which dramatically changed rail business 
environments of these countries.  
In the search for factors explaining divergence between the legislative completeness and 
competition behaviours, we examined features of national cultures, the governments’ roles in 
enforcement of rail liberalisation policy, and the effectiveness of contestability of rail freight 
markets of the countries studied. 
5. Business cultures and national politics in central and south-eastern 
Europe 
The national context analyses indicate that fierce competition could be triggered by strong 
proclivity for risk-taking embedded in some countries’ business cultures. Research into 
entrepreneurial behaviour in Europe shows that dispositions towards risk-taking and acceptance 
of failure are culturally shaped and do affect the establishment of business start-ups and the level 
of competition (Casson, 1995; Hofstede, 1995; Hisrich, 2000; McDougall and Oviatt, 2000). 
Business start-ups occur in almost all places in the world. However, what differs is that the level 
of the start-ups tends to be higher in countries that prize individualism and furthering of 
personal goals. Earlier studies of culturally-rooted dispositions indicate that people in Central 
European countries score higher on risk-taking and individual pursuits of economic worth than 
people in the Nordic region. The latter put more social emphasis on collective values and equality 
as compared to personal achievements and individual rewards (Hofstede, 1995).  
However, one of the new Polish rail freight operators observed pointedly that business agility 
and entrepreneurial spirit are necessary, but by no means sufficient for successful establishment 
of a new railway company. This informant observed that: “The start-up game is often one of 
aerodynamics and drag. The number of factors working against a new company is almost infinite, 
and most companies are unable to even achieve a lift-off. Conquering the “start-up drag” takes 
nearly perfect aerodynamics: a beautifully designed service, good marketing, managerial 
acumen, and plenty of capital - all in concert and, accompanied by great timing”. 
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However, it’s hard to think of any new rail freight start-ups that were so elegantly designed and 
launched to market with such perfect timing. The REORIENT survey of new rail entrants shows 
that to get the “aerodynamics” right, their start-ups required a combination of high demand, large 
investments and profound business experience. Again, as added by the same informant 
“Normally, getting off the ground requires an excess of at least one of these ingredients”.  
Our findings indicate that risk-friendly venture capital was not available at the time when the 
new rail businesses were launched, though timing might have been right because of the large-
scale economic and political re-structuring that was going on in Central and South-eastern 
Europe.  
Yet, what the new European entrepreneurs really had in abundance and what helped them to 
take off was the prior knowledge of the rail sector gained through working experience at national 
railways. This asset made them feel comfortable with perceived risks and gains from the new 
situation. Risk-taking was thus encouraged by familiarity with market conditions, alertness for 
opportunities arising from rail liberalisation and expectations of high financial windfalls from 
improved operational efficiency. 
Willingness for risk-taking was also fostered by political transition from the plan-based 
communistic regimes to liberal democracies with market economies that started in the early 
1990s, and the institutional vacuum which emerged in the interval separating these two systems.  
The profound economic liberalisation that these countries underwent after 1995 was also 
reinforced by deep political changes in the national systems of governance required for entry into 
the European Union which was completed in 2004 by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
and in 2007 by Romania.  
The new economic and political ramification created opportunity windows for the most visionary 
individuals who foresaw termination of railway monopolies and market potentials for private 
rail undertakings. They utilised the institutional vacuum and the old network connections to 
shoulder the risks arising from the lack of financial capital, locomotives, rolling stock, and 
independent maintenance providers. Under these conditions, the political and institutional 
immaturity of the new regulatory regime showed to be an asset rather than a barrier because it 
helped the new rail entrants to utilize the systemic loopholes, and by so doing, reduced the costs 
of market entry.  
Lower administrative hurdles eased entry barriers for the new rail operators, and solidified their 
market foothold. Thus, the turbulence of economic transition from the communist system to 
liberal democracy compensated the new rail entrepreneurs for the relative asset scarcity, and 
generated spectacular growth of private rail business and financial rewards7. Evidently, this 
entrepreneurial dynamism happened within a broader context of socio-economic reforms, whose 
overall objective was political and economic liberalisation. Some of the new entrants realised very 
quickly that in order to reap an adequate scale benefit they needed to offer cross-border freight 
transit, and therefore internationalized their operations. This was especially manifest in the 
strategic behaviours of Polish and Czech private carriers. 
However, the developments over the last several years show that the governments  of Poland, 
Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have modified their political course, reducing, and in 
many cases openly regressing from backing market forces. From a private business perspective, a 
fear may thus emerge that these countries’ support of economic liberalisation may be declining, if 
not ending entirely. This ideological shift is often attributed to reform fatigue affecting these 
countries’ societies, and particularly, to economic hardship endured by large low-income groups 
who suffered disproportionately from the loss of basic welfare that was provided by the previous 
political regime. Rapid disappearance of public jobs, which either became privatized or simply 
                                                        
7 When interviewed, the private freight operators in Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania mentioned that 
their revenues grew by the average 120 p.c. per annum between 2000 and 2005.  
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vanished due to introduction of market-based production methods, caused these social groups to 
experience significant economic deprivation8 This was particularly true for the national railways 
in Central and South-eastern Europe which used to employ hundreds of thousands of people9.  
However, a retrospective glance at these countries’ politics indicates that ascendancy of economic 
populism does not need to imperil market liberalisation. The reason lies in strong political power 
of industrial lobbies that today with equal strength have penetrated the ruling and the opposition 
parties and are pushing from both sides of the political spectrum for more competition. Another 
economic imperative of market liberalisation derives from the need for modernization of the 
government-owned industries and the large investments required for this purpose. So, despite 
the fact that the government in, say, Slovakia, is ideologically against privatisation, it does not 
have enough funds to upgrade the state-owned industry and secure stable public jobs. 
Confronted with the loss of competitiveness and the consequent market demise of public 
enterprises, governments may be forced to accept private capital and cede some of their control 
to business investors10. 
As demonstrated by the political shifts that have occurred over the last twenty years in Central 
and South-eastern Europe, political and economic liberalisation in this region has continued to be 
pursued by power wielders of different political colours. So it may be that the current ruling 
factions will not stifle liberalisation, irrespective of their own populist convictions. The extant 
government elites may be well aware that if they block economic liberalisation they may as well 
block the long-term economic growth. This in turn, may cause them to loose political power 
because national voters will punish them for not fulfilling their wealth expectations. 
6. Rail politics and rail markets in Norway and Sweden 
The First Infrastructure Package and Interoperability Legislation have also affected rail markets 
in Norway and Sweden. However, bearing in mind these countries’ socio-political idiosyncrasies, 
economic profiles and geographical location, the content of these changes was different. The 
institutional divide between Green Cargo AB and Banverket in Sweden, and Cargo Net and 
Jernbaneverket in Norway started in the 1990s, and produced two independent organizations: 
rail carriers and institutionally independent infrastructure managers (IMs). From then on the 
existence of rail freight companies was foremost dependent on fulfilment of shippers’ demands. 
The IMs were constituted as public service agencies with sole responsibility for network 
management, maintenance and investments without any organizational links with rail carriers.  
This rigorous institutional devolution signalled to Green Cargo and Cargo Net rail freight 
                                                        
8 As shown by David Mason (1995, p.59) the demise of omnipresent and omnipotent socialistic state which used 
to provide subsidised food, housing, utilities and vacations has disproportionably hard affected the low-income, 
low-skills employees as compared to the better educated and economically more independent urban dwellers. 
9 The national railways in Poland (PKP) and the Czech Republic (ĈD) used to employ in their heydays 230,000 
and 150,000 people, respectively as evidenced by the Polish and the Czech National Statistical Yearbooks of 1992. 
Although the pay level was low, both railways ran their own welfare schemes which made their employees 
relatively better off than other social groups working for the socialistic states. However, in 2004, the number of 
PKP employees (incorporating the cargo and passenger carriers plus infrastructure managers) was reduced to 
95, 000, while at ĈD to 80,000. 
10 Publicly available documents show that this is exactly happening. In January 2007 the Polish government 
published a plan for sales to private investors a minority share in PKP Cargo’s capital stock in 2008  after the 
company’s finances have been cleared of the state debt (read: accumulated subsidies). In July 2007 the Hungarian 
government put the national freight operator, MÁV Cargo, on sale through public tender. In addition, the 
political shift which followed in Poland the national election on October 21st, 2007 when a new and more 
business-friendly government took over power bodes well for privatisation of national monopolies, including the 
state railways. 
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operators that although they still remained state enterprises, from now on they were totally 
dependent on market forces for revenues, profits, and existence.  
Cargo Net AS is a Swedish and Norwegian state-owned joint venture which provides rail-inter-
modal service to Swedish and Norwegian users, while Green Cargo AB serves the FCL/LCL 
clients in Sweden and Norway. In this way, both incumbents supply a broad range of rail 
shipment service to Swedish and Norwegian markets. Both companies cooperate with DB Railion 
from Germany and with VD ÖY from Finland on provision of international freight trains from/to 
the European mainland and for trans-Siberian traffic. 
In 2003, when the Norwegian Parliament stopped public subsidies to the loss-making cargo 
carrier, the management at NSB Gods, the predecessor of the current Cargo Net AS, had to learn 
how to earn money. At that time, the Norwegian freight company offered wagon-loads, train-
loads and inter-modal transit.  The wagon-load market was loosing money because the low-
margin bulk traffic competed with sea shipping lines which ferried much larger unit volumes at 
lower prices. Therefore, Cargo Net managers decided to phase out the FCL/LCL service and 
concentrate on inter-modal transfer offered as block trains carrying containers, swap-bodies, but 
foremost, semi-trailers.  
This strategy was risky, because about 45 percent of the company’s service revenues vanished 
over night. It was also heavily criticized by trade unions, which were afraid of dramatic business 
loss by their employer. However, after two years, this business model proved to be a boon. The 
Cargo Net managers mentioned four contributors to their market success:  
1) Substantial quality improvement required by shippers of high-value high-margin cargo 
with no tolerance for poor freight service supply,  
2) Considerable cost reduction through block and shuttle trains operated between inter-
modal terminals with total elimination of shunting, bulk-breaking and door-to-door 
service,  
3) Re-structuring of customer base which now consists mainly of logistics service providers, 
forwarders and large network integrators, and  
4) Attainment of scale economies on inter-city connections in Norway and between Sweden 
and Norway. 
The wagon-load market abandoned by CargoNet in Norway was partly acquired by Green Cargo 
AB and partly by small private carriers who offer highly customized services for specific shippers 
or run trains on routes outside Cargo Net’s service coverage area. Yet, none of these new private 
entrants challenges Cargo Net’s container trains on trunk routes in Norway and Sweden. 
It is also worthy to add that despite  the fact that institutional devolution of the Swedish and 
Norwegian cargo operators from the national infrastructure providers was already completed in 
the 1990s, these two cargo carriers did not produce positive financial results until 2005. This 
supports an observation that establishment of transparent, predictable, and efficiently 
deregulated market governance is by no means a sufficient condition for benefiting from rail 
market reform.  
The Norwegian and Swedish examples indicate that changes in these two nations’ railways’ 
markets have been partly achieved by context-specific factors, which may not occur again, and 
which are not transferable to other socio-political settings.  
Yet, they have also revealed a much broader undercurrent that major shifts in these two 
countries’ public utilities are usually enforced by the state initiatives. This leaves little scope for 
private enterprise, which suffers from administrative excess practiced by highly professional 
bureaucracy. In an institutional environment where the state is the main driving force behind 
many important social and economic changes, there is little room for entrepreneurial risk-taking. 
This mode of national governance is supported by collective ideology praising societal 
egalitarianism and rejecting individual entitlements to higher payoffs of risky undertakings 
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(Hofstede, 1995).  It’s not surprising then that the consequent result is uncertainty avoidance and 
private-sector competitive cautiousness.  
Since new rules should never be objectives in themselves, but always a means of achieving their 
public goals, it is hard to assess any socio-economic value of market deregulation without 
reference to actual competition. Because no direct intra-rail competition has so far been 
developed between operators in Norway and Sweden, one may wonder how many socio-
economic and environmental benefits have so far been created by rail deregulation. A relevant 
question that may be posed here is whether these countries’ regulatory bodies may not need to 
engage themselves more in removal of power asymmetry between the incumbents and the 
technically capable entrants who may wish to compete in the rail freight market. Power 
asymmetry could for instance be removed by offering some technical and operational assistance 
and financial guarantees for aspiring entrants that eventually may bring more competition into 
the rail freight market.  
Still, one may argue that the sheer existence of deregulated market governance may function as a 
proxy for the actual competition due to perpetual threat of new entries. Thus, competitive 
challenge from hypothetical rivals may prevent a monopolist from inflating its freight rates and 
restricting its service output (Baumol, Panzar and Willing, 1982).  
However, the contestable market argument has not been empirically corroborated by the 
REORIENT study which has shown that in order to start an effective rivalry in inter-modal 
freight market dominated by Cargo Net in Norway and in Sweden, the aspiring rail 
entrepreneurs need to possess flatcars, multi-system locomotives, and access to inter-modal 
terminals. This equipment is both prohibitively expensive and not easily available on the 
European rolling stock market. None of the private rail operators surveyed here has either tried 
or acquired production assets required for inter-modal service. Besides, the willingness of Cargo 
Net to capitalize on the upward trend in the Swedish and Norwegian freight markets is also 
constrained by the lack of means for financing capacity expansion. The Swedish and Norwegian 
states, who own the carrier, are not interested in fostering growth of the company and Cargo Net 
cannot float its shares on the stock exchange without these governments’ approval. 
Thus, the absence of real competitors in the Swedish and Norwegian rail freight markets poses at 
least two serious political problems. The first is the lack of a benchmark for comparing the costs 
of production of rail freight service and the resource efficiency of the national operators with 
those of private carriers. Given that the operational efficiency affects the cost of service supply 
and the competitiveness of rail freight transport as compared to motorised conveyance, this 
deficiency deters the European and the national policy makers from designing the policy 
measures that may reverse the current rail-truck competitive asymmetry and increase the 
magnitude of socio-economic and environmental gains from rail freight liberalisation. The second 
drawback is the lack of means on the part of the state cargo companies to expand into rapidly 
growing international freight markets, perpetuating thereby the dominance of motorised 
transport in European freight transfer and growth in severe socio-environmental harms ensuing 
from road-rail imbalance. 
The evidence mustered here indicates that the economic and environmental gains of the new rail 
freight regulatory regime in Norway and in Sweden are still far from validated.  
7. Conceptual utility of the NPM theorem 
This article has established that the NPM concept was useful for gaining an understanding of 
changes that the First Infrastructure Package and the Interoperability Directive invoked on the 
national railway systems and rail freight markets analysed here. 
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The goal of the NPM strategy as applied by the European Commission was  
1) to improve market position of rail freight through increased competition and more efficient 
utilization of production assets, and 2) to reduce the negative socio-environmental externalities 
attributed to motorized conveyance by increasing the freight tonnage moved by rail. Moreover, 
most of the countries targeted sought also to diminish public expenditures on rail transport. 
The analyses show that liberalisation of rail freight market in several Central and South-eastern 
European countries in line with the NPM model embodied in the EC directives is still far from 
complete. This implementation deficit indicates that the socio-economic features of the target 
country may affect the reform effectiveness despite the prevalence of positive market conditions. 
Enforcement of rail liberalization legislation in countries like Poland and Hungary was hampered 
by political opposition from the key affected actors, such as the trade unions of national railways’ 
employees whose jobs were threatened by liberalisation of rail freight market. Specifically in 
Poland, with its traditionally large public sector, the wellbeing of voters who lost means of 
subsistence as a consequence of rail freight deregulations became a serious political liability for 
the national government11.   
In addition, the weakness of the newly reformed national institutions in the most recent EU-
members has also played a role because the formal institutional devolution between these 
countries’ infrastructure managers (IMs) and the national cargo operators is still compromised by 
informal networks and biased administrative praxis, which de facto shield the national 
incumbents from market forces.  
Thus, for understanding the relationship between the quality of legislative conformance and the 
pattern of market competition, the political legacy of the newly liberated countries has been 
invoked. The relatively fierce intra-rail competition in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania 
can be explained by seemingly two opposite forces. On the one hand, the transition to market-
oriented political system released entrepreneurial spirit and willingness to compete engrained in 
these countries’ national cultures. On the other hand however, prior knowledge of rail sector on 
the part of new rail entrants, along with the paradox of institutional immaturity within the newly 
reformed rail administration have collectively reduced business risks and the cost of market 
entry for the new rail start-ups. These two factors have together contributed to restructuring of 
rail freight markets in Central and South-eastern Europe, and emergence of intra-rail rivalry.  
Against this backdrop, the relative scarcity of new entrants into rail freight markets in the Nordic 
countries and the consequent low level of intra-rail competition can be ascribed to comparatively 
rigorous requirements for granting operational and safety licenses and the national parliaments’ 
unwillingness to subsidize the loss-making state-owned cargo carriers which took affect in the 
1990s. The latter forced the government operators to compete with truck, while the first one 
preserved their market dominance. The different trajectories of rail market liberalisation in the 
Nordic countries and in the new EU-member states in Central and South-eastern Europe indicate 
that the impacts of the focal countries’ political features, which depending on the national 
situation either hindered or fostered inter-modal competition and rebalancing of road-rail modal 
split may shed some light on the deeply polarized picture of the European rail freight market.  
However, the role of context-specific factors was absent from the conceptual framework affecting 
the empirical utility of the NPM model.  
As a result, the adoption of the NPM strategy alone can not be considered as sufficient condition 
for reduction of the negative socio-environmental externalities of truck transport because intra-
rail competition in Central and South-eastern Europe has not as yet led to inter-modal rivalry. 
Nor can implementation of the NPM concept be seen as a necessary factor because although the 
                                                        
11 This issue is dealt with in a more thorough manner in another article “Liberalisation of Rail Freight Markets in 
Central and South-eastern Europe: What the European Commission Can Do to Facilitate Rail Market Opening”, 
which explicitly focuses on behaviours of the national governments in Central and South-eastern European 
countries under deregulation of rail freight markets. 
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Nordic rail markets encompass inter-modal rivalry, they still lack intra-rail rivalry.  
An alternative explanation that the lack of inter-modal competition in the new EU member states 
can be attributed to small size of these countries’ freight markets is not supported by the 
empirical data which show that an uninterrupted growth in freight volumes moved in these 
nations’ domestic and international traffic during 1999-2007, was almost entirely captured by 
motorized operators. 
The evidence reviewed suggests that the utility of NPM strategy for attainment of the socio-
political objectives sought by the European Commission cannot be corroborated. This indicates a 
need for adoption of policy measures, which also take into consideration the political, cultural 
and economic features of the focal countries before another Europe-wide policy initiative is being 
launched. Otherwise, compliance with the European legislation may become timely and 
resource-demanding, while the outcomes uncertain. 
8. Summary and conclusions 
This research has established that countries in the northernmost, central, and south-eastern 
regions of Europe vary considerably as regards implementation of the First Infrastructure 
Package and Interoperability Directive. Empirical analyses unearthed a clearly polarised picture 
of legislative compliance and competition in rail freight markets analysed here.  
Norway, Sweden and Finland emerged as one country cluster characterised by complete 
legislative fulfilment, but whose national cargo operators are not yet exposed to competition 
from private rail entrants.  Nonetheless, these countries’ national carriers managed to re-structure 
themselves and today compete successfully with motorised operators by offering high quality 
inter-modal service, without however increasing the share of rail transport in the national freight 
markets. The lack of competitors in the Nordic freight markets can be partly attributed to a 
generally low level of entrepreneurship, especially in the rail sector which traditionally was 
controlled by the state, but also to relatively high costs of compliance with regulatory 
requirements which discourage financially weak, but technically capable prospective private 
ventures.  As a consequence, the national railways in these countries still enjoy quasi-
monopolistic positions, albeit with competitive exposure to motorized conveyance. However, 
despite the relative success in competition with road operators, the state-owned railways in 
Norway, Sweden and Finland failed to benefit from the positive trend in freight markets, which 
predominantly were captured by truck. 
On the other end of rail liberalisation spectrum we see Poland, Hungary, The Czech Republic, 
Austria, Romania, and Greece, which lag on legislative implementation, and whose national 
markets are still dominated by incumbents. Yet, the share of domestic rail market controlled by 
private operators in Poland, Romania and The Czech Republic is quite sizable indicating that 
these entrepreneurs effectively compete with state railways in traditional FCL and LCL segments. 
This happens, however, in market with decreasing share of rail freight and consistent increase in 
motorised transport. 
However, in spite of fierce intra-rail rivalry, the new operators have not as yet managed to 
compete with truck for high-value, high-margin cargo. Still, in a positive vein, the intra-rail 
rivalry instigated by the new operators has occurred in regulatory environments which still 
discriminate against new entrants by providing state subsidies to national railways, restricting 
access to rail terminals and border crossings, and where the infrastructure freight fees are among 
the highest in Europe. 
Finally Hungary, Austria, and Greece represent a cluster of its own where the legislative 
requirements are still far from being met, and where neither intra-modal nor inter-modal 
competition has as yet emerged. 
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These outcomes indicate that a very tenuous causal relationship could be inferred between the 
legislative completeness and market dynamics. One may conclude thus that market 
developments in both country categories, i e., these which have fulfilled all legislative 
requirements and those which have yet a long way to go deviate from the expectations of the 
European lawmaker. Despite the fact that freight markets in the Nordic countries and in Central 
and South-eastern Europe kept growing over the last ten years, the railways in both regions did 
not manage to increase their share of the total freight carriage. In the Nordic countries the rail-
road competition did not reward Cargo Net with higher market share in Norway and Sweden, 
only prevented its downward slide. The winner is truck. As regards the former communist block 
countries, the intra-rail competition happened in a declining rail-service market and under 
explosive growth of domestic and international freight tonnage which mainly is served by truck. 
Truck operators managed thus to capture the market lost by railways and capitalise on the net 
growth in volumes of freight shipped. Consequently, the policy instruments that the European 
Commission applied to liberalise the European rail freight market did not as yet contribute to 
reduction of socio-environmental ills attributed to dominance of truck in European freight 
transfer.  
This finding suggests that the legislative imperatives of the First Infrastructure Package and the 
Interoperability Directives may need to be accompanied by executive measures that will take into 
account the national idiosyncrasies of railway systems and the state’s role in enforcement of 
market opening. More specifically, two types of measures may be needed 1) these facilitating the 
actual termination of national rail monopolies, and 2) those providing financial and regulatory 
assistance to aspiring rail entrepreneurs. 
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